Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce Lifesaving Medical Resources by unknown
When an organ transplant is the only method avail-
able to maintain life, and when there are more
patients in need of transplantation than there are
organs available, the selection of patients becomes
literally a question of pronouncing a death sentence
upon those to whom organ transplantation is denied.'
Due Process in the Allocation of Scarce
Lifesaving Medical Resources
Observers from numerous fields have been troubled by the diffi-
culty of making life and death decisions in the allocation of scarce
medical resources. 2 An important question for lawyers is whether the
decision to deny a scarce medical resource calls for procedural safe-
guards. The effect of the due process clause 3 in this area has yet to
come under systematic scholarly or judicial scrutiny.4 Although one
1. Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibilities, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 480, 497 (1968).
2. For example, a professor of psychiatry writes that in the "tragic area of fatal
kidney disease . . . [t]he burden is not deciding who should be helped to live, but
rather who should be left to die." Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man,
15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 273, 313 (1968). In addition to the remarks of Grad (lawyer), supra
note 1, and Gorney (psychiatrist), see the discussions (1) by ethicists: P. RAMSEY, THE
PATIENT AS PERSON 239-75 (1971); Fletcher, Dialogue between Medicine and Theology,
in SHOULD DocTORs PLAY GOD? 150 (C. Frazier ed. 1971); Rescher, The Allocation of
Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy, 79 ETHics 173 (1969); (2) by sociologists: R. Fox &
J. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL (1974); Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand &- Simmons,
Family Tension in the Search for a Kidney Donor, 215 J.A.M.A. 909 (1971); (3) by
physicians: Calland, latrogenic Problems in End-Stage Renal Failure, 287 NEw ENc..
J. MED. 334 (1972); David, The Agony and the Ecstacy of the Nephrologist, 222 J.A.M.A.
584 (1972); Farrow, Fisher & Johnson, Dialysis and Transplantation: The National Picture
over the Next Five Years, 3 B1RITIS MED. J. 686 (1972); and (4) by legal scholars: Calabresi,
Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 387 (1969); Sanders
& Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplan-
tation, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 357 (1968); cf. Reichsman & Levy, Problems in Adaptation
to Maintenance Hemodialysis, 130 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 859, 863-64 (1972) (de-
scription of the emotional difficulties of potential recipients of a scarce lifesaving
resource).
3. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... U.S. COsT. amend. XIV. See id. amend. V.
4. There has been almost no discussion of due process in the medical area. One
writer advocates that civil rights lawyers become involved in issues of medical rights,
but admits:
[O]ne reason lawyers have not become involved in medical decision-making is that
both they and their potential clients are unsure of how to approach the area ana-
lytically and thus how to determine when legal intervention is appropriate.
Annas, Medical Remedies and Human Rights: Why Civil Rights Lawyers Must Become
Involved in Medical Decision-Making, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 156 (1972). Another, pro-
posing review procedures for the distribution of scarce medical resources, considers the
possibility of review based upon constitutional grounds, but admits:
The latter ... is included in the proposal not because I am aware of the existence
of specific constitutional demands, but on the general principle that a legal process
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scarce device, the hemodialysis (or kidney) machine, has been subsi-
dized under the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, a recent
report of the Government Accounting Office indicates that not all
who are entitled to treatment for chronic kidney failure are receiving
it.' The 1972 amendments reflect increased public concern in the
area of scarce medical resources, but leave the underlying constitu-
tional problem unresolved. If the development of new medical tech-
nology continues unabated, the problem of allocating scarce resources
will become more acute. 6
should never deprive its officers of the power to order that action be taken in
compliance with the Constitution.
Katz, Process Design for Selection of Hemodialysis and Organ Transplant Recipients,
22 BUFFALO L. REv. 373, 400 (1973). See also Kutner, Due Process of Human Transplants:
A Proposal, 24 U. Mi~mi L. REv. 782, 798 (1970) (calls for due process in determining
time of death).
Recently there have been a number of suits challenging the absence of procedural
safeguards in decisions by hospitals to begin or terminate treatment of needy patients.
These suits have resulted in interlocutory injunctions against denials of treatment and
in settlements requiring the implementation of safeguards. None of these suits involved
lifesaving benefits. See Grein v. St. Paul Drug Rehabilitation Center, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 45 (D. Minn. 1974); Grasso v. Patch, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 748 (D. Mass. 1974)
(plaintiff methadone patients agreed to a dismissal of their due process challenge to
termination of treatment; defendant administrators agreed to adopt regulations affording
notice and right to counsel, to present witnesses and to testify); Hileman v. Duval
County Hosp. Authority, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 490 (M.D. Fla., filed Nov. 1973) (chal-
lenge by residents of Duval County to a denial without a hearing of medical care by
defendant public hospital for "administrative reasons" was settled when defendants
established a hearing procedure); Ramirez v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Health Serv.,
8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 109 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1974) (plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction
preventing defendant from terminating them from methadone treatment without a prior
hearing; defendant was ordered to adopt procedures for appealing termination decisions
and to provide notice of procedures). See also Rose, General Practice Complaints-Case
for a Patient's Advocate, 122 Nmw L.J. 774, 775, 788 (1972); Note, Unnecessary Surgery:
Doctor and Hospital Liability, 61 GEo. L.J. 807, 831-32 (1973).
5. For a description of the hemodialysis machine, see note 37 infra. The 1972 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)-(g) (1974), Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 299,
86 Stat. 1463-64, made funds available to those eligible for Social Security benefits for
hemodialysis and kidney transplants.
According to COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
TREATMENT OF CHRONIC KIDNEY FAILURE: DIALYSIS, TRANSPLANT, COSTS, AND THE NEED FOR
MORE VIrOROUS EFFORTS (HEW June 24, 1975) the 1972 amendments do not effectively
alleviate the scarcity of these lifesaving resources. First, doctors frequently do not refer
to treatment centers all those entitled to dialysis or transplants. Id. at 12-15. Moreover,
officials of dialysis centers continue to exclude potential recipients from treatment on
various medical and social grounds, although in theory there is no financial impediment.
For example, some centers which provide only home dialysis, exclude applicants they
believe lack the "medical and psychological stability," "motivation," or adequate home
facilities to undergo treatment. Id. at 16-17. Finally the report points out that by their
terms the Social Security amendments leave substantial financial burden on the patient.
Id. at 49-50, 53.
6. The problem of scarcity is apt to arise with particular force in the area of arti-
ficial hearts. Given the present technology, it has been estimated that such devices will
become available within 10 years. THE ARTIFICIAL HEART ASSESSMENT PANEL OF THE NA-
TIONAL HEART AND LUNG INSTITUTE, THE TOTALLY IMPLANTABLE ARTIFICIAL HEART 37 (1973).
Because heart dysfunction is widespread, a long period during which potential recipients
will be denied the device must be anticipated. See id. at 41-45.
Another area of impending scarcity is the treatment of hemophilia. If prophylaxis
(at present the most effective treatment of severe hemophilia) were to be given to only
those who suffer from severe hemophilia, over 13,000,000 units of whole blood would
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This Note will explore the extent to which due process is required
in decisions by hospitals to withhold the benefits of scarce lifesaving
treatment. The Note will argue (1) that since a substantial proportion
of hospitals are government owned and operated, and most remaining
hospitals have important connections with government, there is suf-
ficient state action to make the due process clause applicable; (2) that
denial of treatment is a deprivation of life within the meaning of the
due process clause; and (3) that established procedures, which leave
room for arbitrary and discriminatory decisions, are constitutionally
invalid.7 The Note then suggests procedures that might satisfy the
requirements of due process.
I. The Requirement of Due Process in the Allocation Decision
A. State Action
Decisions to grant or deny a scarce lifesaving resource are typically
made by committees or individuals acting on behalf of the hospital.8
Due process is required only if these decisions can be considered acts
of the state." State action is generally present if the institution is pub-
licly owned and operated-i.e., a federal, state or municipal hospital-
at least in acts carried out on behalf of such hospitals by employees
or other agents of the state in their official capacities.' 0 In the United
States, approximately 38 percent of all hospitals, with approximately
54 percent of all hospital beds, are public.'1
be required. The number of units collected for that purpose in 1971 was approximately
9,000,000. Optimal treatment of severe cases alone would therefore require 4,000,000
more units than are presently available. See NATIONAL HEART AND LUNG INSTITUTE, BLOOD
R SOURCE STUDIEs 29, 127 (summary vol., Nat'l Institute of Health 1972). Failure to re-
ceive this optimal treatment may have a "crippling" effect on a patient suffering from
severe hemophilia, but will not necessarily cause death. Interview with Dr. Jan Van
Eys, Head of Pediatrics, M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Institute, Houston, Tex., June
6, 1975 (telephone).
7. The immediate purpose of this Note is to propose procedural standards for de-
cisionmaking. It is not concerned with the content of decisions, but with the possibility
of failure of the system to adhere to its own substantive standards (e.g., the failure of
a hospital, professing to give priority to those with the largest number of dependents,
to ensure an accurate count of the dependents).
8. See pp. 1742-43 infra.
9. Due process is compelled by the Fifth Amendment where the federal government
is involved and by the Fourteenth Amendment where state or local government is in-
volved. The general term "state action" is used to refer to both forms of government
involvement.
10. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("The Four-
teenth Amendment . . . protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its crea-
tures .... "); Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (95th
ed. 1974).
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The status of private hospitals is less clear. The general test of
state action calls for a "sifting [of] facts and weighing [of] circum-
stances" to determine whether the state has "so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence [with a private owner] that it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity .... ,,2
There are many private hospitals in which the government partici-
pates significantly in ownership and operation. This may in itself be
sufficient to establish the presence of state action in those activities
of the hospital which affect the public.13 And all hospitals, even those
which are purely privately owned and operated, are subject to general
government regulation and receive widely distributed government as-
sistance. Especially because hospitals perform what some courts de-
scribe as a "public function,"' 4 the receipt of federal Hill-Burton
funds for hospital construction 15 and receipt of Medicare and Medi-
caid funds' may be sufficient ties to government to establish a position
of "interdependence" with the state.
Some activities of a hospital may involve state action while others
do not.' 7 The test of "interdependence" must be applied to the specific
i
12. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725 (1961), cited in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) and Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
13. For example, state action was established where roughly half of the members of
the hospital's board of governors were by charter responsible to, or were themselves, pub-
lic officials and 14 percent of its budget was derived from public funds. Chiaffitelli v.
Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971). Or the hospital may receive sub-
stantial government appropriations or be built on government land. Eaton v. Grubbs,
329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
14. Compare Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33,
35 (6th Cir. 1968) (characterizing normal hospital activity as a "public function" in
finding state action) with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972)(refusing to find state action where the lodge was not open to the public). See also
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(holding that private nonprofit hospitals are "charitable" for tax purposes, even if they
do not provide free services, because they do serve a community function).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o-I (1974). The first case to base a finding of state action for
private hospitals on Hill-Burton funding was Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Gen. Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1963) (racial discrimination). While
not all hospitals receive such funds, all are located in "Hill-Burton states" (telephone
interview with Donald Sylvain, Division of Facilities Development, HEW, Apr. 3, 1975).
Thus all are subjected to Hill-Burton regulations, another factor in favor of finding
state action. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964). The scope of the Hill-Burton
Act has recently been enlarged by the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-641 (Jan. 4, 1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-139511 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 159 6-13 9 6g (1970) respectively.
See 2 T. EMiERSON, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 2191-92 n.3 (3d ed. 1967). But see Watkins
v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D. Idaho 1973) (pointing out that these
funds are not tied to state-imposed policy constraints). Watkins overlooks the fact that
the government, through these funds, uses hospitals to assist in a public function, i.e.,
ensuring that all citizens are provided with health care. Likewise, passage of national
health insurance legislation would strengthen a finding of government action. Cf. S.3,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Sen. Kennedy's proposal for national health insurance).
17. See cases cited in note 19 infra. Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 350-51 (1974) (public utility).
1737
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 1734, 1975
activity in question here-the allocation of scarce medical resources.
To the extent that the state is involved at all in the operations of a
hospital, its involvement is in support of the hospital's ultimate func-
tion of promoting the public health."8 Lower federal courts have found
state action in various arbitrary and discriminatory practices by hospi-
tals in which the state was no more implicated than in the allocation
of medical resources,1 9 and have accepted the idea that state action
should more readily be found where the challenged function bears
on "a concern touching health and life itself." 20
Thus for the substantial sector of the nation's medical institutions
comprised of public hospitals, state action is clearly present and pro-
cedural safeguards are required. While the presence of state action in
the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources by private hospitals is not
beyond question,21 it is at the very least a valid hypothesis. Should
18. There are indications of a congressional intent to ensure the adequate distribu-
tion of medical resources. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970), the "purpose" clause of
the Hill-Burton Act, which provides federal construction funds through state channels
in order to
assist the several States in the carrying out of their programs for the construction
and modernization of such public or other nonprofit community hospitals and other
medical facilities as may be necessary, in conjunction with existing facilities, to
furnish adequate hospital, clinic or similar services to all of their people.
(Emphasis added.) See also 42 U.S.C. 1395(c) (1970) (Medicare) and 42 U.S.C. 1396
(1970) (Medicaid).
19. See Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974)
(state action where hospital terminated privileges of physician without a hearing); Sams
v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (state action where hospitals
denied staff appointments and privileges to physicians practicing outside county); Mere-
dith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968) (state
action where hospital allegedly denied physician reappointment without hearing and
notice); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 651
& n.3 (4th Cir. 1967) (state action where hospital denied application for staff membership
by black physician); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, Inc., -360 F.2d 577
(4th Cir. 1966) (state action where hospital discharged nurses protesting racial segrega-
tion); ef. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 306-08 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (state
action where hospital restricted privileges of physician based on performance) (dictum).
However, courts may find no state action where the hospital activity in question is
affected by religious scruples or is a matter of internal management in the absence
of invidious discrimination. See, e.g., Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Medical
Center, 507 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) (termination of physician's staff privileges not
state action); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 312-14 (9th Cir.
1974) (denominational hospital's refusal to perform sterilization because of religious and
moral scruples not state action). See also Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487
F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 1973); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 761-62 (7th
Cir. 1973) (Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent hospital from denying facilities
for abortions); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 1973) (Fourteenth
Amendment does not prevent discharge of physician from staff); Mulvihill v. Julia L.
Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
20. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone General Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963).
21. See cases cited in note 19, supra. Although some commentators have asserted the
presence of state action in private hospitals (see, e.g., 2 T. EiFRSON, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RiGHTs 2191 n.3 (3d ed. 1967)), the recent Supreme Court decision in Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), weakens their assumption. In Jackson. plaintiff
sued a private Pennsylvania utility company to enjoin the termination of her electric
service without a hearing. Plaintiff's claim of state action rested on the company's ex-
tensive regulation by the state, its status as a government-protected monopoly, and the
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that hypothesis prevail, it is important to determine its constitutional
implications, i.e., what process is "'due." Even if only public hospitals
are subject to constitutional requirements, private hospitals may well
want to adopt procedural standards similar to those suggested in this
Note.22
B. Deprivation of Life
Those denied access to scarce lifesaving resources will die as a re-
sult; the question is whether this constitutes a deprivation of life with-
in the meaning of the due process clause. An essential rule established
by the Supreme Court provides that "[w]hether any procedural pro-
tections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will
fact that it provided an essential public service. Id. at 351-53. The Court held these
factors insufficient, reasoning that the general regulation did not amount to a sufficiently
close nexus between the state and the company. Id. at 353. The Court distinguished
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding racial discrimina-
tion by a private restaurant within a public parking building to fall within "state ac-
tion") on its facts, finding no "symbiotic" relationship between the state and defendant.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra at 357-58.
The reasoning in Jackson does not preclude a finding of state action for private hospi-
tals receiving government aid via Hill-Burton and other typical government assistance
and regulation. First, unlike the defendant in Jackson such hospitals are funded as well
as regulated by the government. Cf. id. at 357. The public-private relationship is ar-
guably "symbiotic"; the aim of Hill-Burton construction money is to ensure that there
are enough medical care facilities for everyone, see note 18 supra. The government's
scheme relies on private efforts to carry out the administrative tasks, without which
construction funds could not serve their purpose. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, supra at 717, 723-24. Second, and more important, is the special nature of
the public function which hospitals perform. In Jackson, the Court recognized as a
principle governing the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment that "differences in circum-
stances beget differences in law." 419 U.S. at 358. The Court there declined to find
that the .public function of supplying electricity rose to the level of state action because
the service was one which the state never obliged itself to supply. Id. at 353. In con-
trast, states invariably supply public medical facilities, independent of or complementary
to existing private facilities. While the Court suggests that the public function should
also be one traditionally associated with sovereignty, id., and that occasional govern-
ment provision of the service may not be sufficient, id. at 354 n.9, these suggestions
should not relieve medical institutions of a finding of state action. The relevant con-
sideration should be whether providing medical services can be considered a state
function today. Moreover, to exempt private hospitals from state action would not serve
to promote individual choice (unlike the Court's example of private schooling, where
a state action standard might limit constitutionally protected choices). See id. at 354 n.9;
id. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A final distinction is that in hospital activity, unlike
the functioning of utilities, there is no intermediate regulatory agency (except the hospital
itself) between the state and the recipient of services which can oversee the implemen-
tation of state policies. Regulatory authority has arguably been "delegated" to hospital
administrators, who therefore should be considered agents of the state. See generally
Note, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in Terminations of Utility Services for Xon-
payment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1477 (1973).
22. Public policy does not require that the procedures employed by public and
private hospitals be the same. Application of constitutional requirements to public hos-
pitals alone would provide a body of experience for private hospitals to consider. They
may decide to adopt the constitutional procedures voluntarily, or to experiment withi
other procedures which might eventually be shown to strike a more favorable balance
between costs and benefits than those safeguards which the courts would presently be
willing to require.
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be 'condemned to suffer grievous, loss.' ,,23 Someone whose very life
depends on access to scarce medical resources surely meets this stan-
dard, particularly since an individual denied access to treatment by
one hospital is often not able to obtain equivalent treatment from
another.2 4 One might argue that access to a highly specialized life-
saving device is pure "bounty," a "mere" privilege. But recent cases
have repudiated the distinction between "privileges" and "rights" as
a basis for establishing a requirement of due process. 25
Whether there is a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due
process clause depends in part on how strong and how justified are
the expectations of the person affected by an adverse decision.2 In
the case of scarce lifesaving resources, an individual can justifiably
expect a hospital not to deny him those resources without a reason.
Both legislative policy2 7 and the medical profession 25 avow an intent
to distribute health care as widely as possible. Even without such an
acknowledged purpose, the widespread public understanding that the
medical profession is committed to such ends might well justify the
expectation of being eligible for lifesaving treatment.2 9 People can
23. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
24. An individual is generally dependant upon a single institution for scarce medical
resources since illness creates time pressure, and individuals lack access to information
about other sources of treatment. Large geographical areas often depend upon a single
hospital and there may be prohibitive costs involved with seeking treatment outside
one's area.
25. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972).
26. Compare Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-77 (1972) (state college non-
tenured professor whose one-year contract had ended held not entitled to procedural
safeguards in the determination of whether a new contract should be offered to him)
with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (college professor with similar claim
established the basis for a finding of de facto, although not formal, tenure, which en-
titled him to due process protections in the determination of whether to grant a new
contract). Note that in Roth, the Court stated that, if there had been a showing of
"substantial adverse effect" upon the career of the professor, it might have resolved
the case differently, but that a record indicating merely that the individual would be
left "somewhat less attractive" by this discharge was insufficient to establish "depri-
vation of 'liberty.'" Board of Regents v. Roth, supra at 574 n.13. See also Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-58, 164-71 (1974) (three Justices in the plurality held that
appellee's job was not elevated to a "property interest" because of limitations on tenure
in enabling statute; two concurring Justices recognized a property interest, but one
sufficiently protected by a hearing subsequent to job termination).
27. See notes 15, 18 supra.
28. Oaths taken by individuals entering the medical profession support an under-
standing by society that members of the profession will not favor one individual at
the expense of another for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. See, e.g., oaths quoted
in Goodfield, Reflections on the Hippocratic Oaths, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 79,
84 (1973); Guthrie, Early Greek and Roman Medicine in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
826, 827 (15th ed. 1974). Belief in individuals' entitlement to the treatment itself is
revealed by current proposals for compensation of persons faced with severe medical
crises. See S. 2513, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973) (Sen. Long's Catastrophic Health Insurance
and Medical Assistance Reform Bill, now pending before the Senate Finance Comm.).
29. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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legitimately expect both the state and the medical profession to make
an effort to keep them alive.30
Whether the grant of a benefit is d bounty-a "unilateral expecta-
tion" 31-or a "legitimate claim of entitlement"32 depends ultimately
on how vital is the interest at stake. 33 The state has been held to have
"deprived" one of a protected interest when denying a request for a
benefit in cases involving distribution of housing34 and other benefits
less vital than access to lifesaving medical resources. 35 If the require-
ment of due process ever applies to the grant of a benefit, access to
scarce lifesaving treatment would seem to call most strongly for this
protection. The denial of such an interest entails the ultimate loss;
the customary and legitimate expectations are extremely high.3"
II. A Case Study in Inadequate Procedures
The scarcity of a medical resource is apt to be most acute when
the underlying technology is both new and expensive. One of the
30. See JOINT COMMISSION ON AccREDITATIoN OF HOSPITALS, SrANDARDS FOR ACCREDITA-
TION OF HOSPITALS PLUS PROVISIONAL INTERPRETATIONS 45 (1969) (providing that: "Ade-
quate appraisal and advice or initial treatment shall be rendered to any ill or injured
person who presents himself at the hospital."). Emergency room treatment is a subject
of reasonable reliance under this analysis. A tort of omission has been found where a
hospital maintaining emergency facilities "refuse[s] . . . service in case of unmistakable
emergency." See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 25, 174 A.2d 135,
140 (1961).
31. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
32. Id.
33. The Court in Roth reasoned that the extent of an individual's legitimate ex-
pectation was largely determined by the magnitude of the interest at stake and how
irrevocable the loss if the interest were denied. See id. at 573-74. Thus, although the
petitioner lost in Roth (in part on the grounds that he had no reason to expect his
contract would be renewed and that he could probably find another job, see id.), the
very same reasoning might well justify a requirement of procedural safeguards in the
case of one applying for scarce lifesaving resources.
34. See Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir.
1968) (affirming the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss complaint by re-
jected applicants for housing who alleged lack of notice of regulations on admissions,
lack of a systematic process for approving applications, lack of any way to gauge the
progress of one's case, and, if and when ineligibility was decided, lack of notification
thereof or of the reasons for it); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) (public
housing tenants threatened with eviction have right to a hearing even after their lease
expires).
35. See Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th
Cir. 1971) (application for admission to the medical staff of a hospital could only be
denied on grounds which were reasonably related to operation of the hospital, and due
process required giving the applicant an opportunity to contradict or explain facts
which might lead the defendant Board to reject him); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964) (due process required in anting of liquor licenses; no valid distinction
between the denial of an application and the revocation of a license); Harnett v. Board
of Zoning, Subdiv. & Bldg. Appeals, 350 F. Supp. 1159 (D.V.I. 1972) (due process requires
notice of standards for decision where zoning board approves development plans).
36. The Supreme Court has recognized that customary understandings may be as valid
a source of constitutional rights as statutes. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603
(1972). Such a principle makes seffse especially in light of the fact that the fortuities of
history have led some kinds of social welfare to be provided privately by professions and
others to be provided publicly by legislative or other governmental mandate.
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most widely publicized lifesaving devices in recent years has been the
hemodialysis machine. 37 Starting in 1973 large government subsidies
made hemodialysis machines more widely available; but the methods
of allocation of these devices prevailing before 1973 are the best il-
lustration of how medical institutions handle life and death decisions
compelled by scarcity.3s
The possibility of arbitrary and inaccurate decisionmaking is exem-
plified by the procedures followed by two public institutions-the Los
Angeles County General Hospital and the San Francisco General Hos-
pital-in determining access to hemodialysis. In a 1967 account, the
director of the California State Department of Health described four
junctures at which an individual might be denied access to treatment: 39
(1) the patient's physician had discretion to decide whether or not to
refer the patient to the hemodialysis program of the medical center;40
(2) the medical director of the program had discretion to decide
whether to place the individual in the pool of people to be evaluated
at the medical center; (3) medical evaluators at the center were called
upon to make a finding of "medical suitability"; and (4) a patient
selection committee including lay people made a finding of worthiness
for treatment "from an overall standpoint." 41 Empirical studies report
that similar patterns prevailed in the allocation practices of private
institutions.42
The decisions by medical directors whether or not to include an
individual in the pool from which recipients of services would be
37. The hemodialysis machine performs the function of a kidney-cleansing the blood
of toxic elements-for individuals whose kidneys have ceased to function. Through regu-
lar treatments an individual can be kept alive; without treatment he or she will die
of kidney failure within roughly three weeks. In the late 1960's an estimated 7,000
people died every year for lack of such treatment. Note, Scarce Medical Resourceq, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 636-37 (1969).
38. See note 5 supra. For a survey of the processes of scarce medical resource allo-
cation in the late 1960's, see Note, supra note 37, and records of empirical study by the
author of that Note, including interviews with hospital administrators and records of
allocation committees, on file at the Columbia Law Library. While the scarcity of kidney
machines has been partly alleviated by measures like the 1972 amendments to the
Social Security Act, see note 5 supra, medical institutions will almost surely have to
deal with serious scarcities in the future. See note 6 supra.
39. Breslow, Public Health Report, 107 CALIF. IED. 360 (1967), cited in Sanders &
Dukeminier, supra note 2, at 367.
40. This step, which does not involve acts of the hospital, is beyond the scope of
this Note.
41. Breslow, supra note 39, at 360.
42. Note, supra note 37, at 635-62. In some hospitals, allocation was based on a first-
come first-served or a lottery system with no allowance for medical or social criteria.
See, e.g., A PHYSICIAN'S SYLLABUS FOR THE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC UREMIA 4-5 (R. David-
son & B. Scribner eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SYLLABUS]. Such procedures are well
adapted to a selection with no underlying substantive standards. But they are consistent
only with a refusal to adopt substantive standards. When substantive standards are de-
sired for the allocation of scarce medical resources, such mechanical procedures lose
their particular value.
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chosen gave them in effect a preliminary veto over further considera-
tion of a patient.43 The directors might be governed by articulated
priorities (e.g., an upper age limit) or by informal priorities not openly
stated.4 4 The selection of the ultimate recipients of treatment by
medical and lay committees then proceeded according to standards
chosen by the hospital, which might include the following:
1) Medical suitability;
2) Psychological and' sociological suitability, e.g., motivation to
live, cooperation, or absence of obvious psychosis;
3) Social worth (this judgment was often left to the unguided
discretion of the committee, or it might be guided by standards
such as rehabilitative potential, manifest desire to live and enjoy
life, "moral value," vocational history, intelligence, family status);
4) Mechanical procedures, e.g., lottery or first-come first-served.45
The risk of arbitrariness, discrimination, and mistake grew out of a
number of procedural inadequacies in the practices just detailed. 1)
Lack of notice. Applicants were not necessarily aware of the fact that
they were being considered for exclusion or selection, nor were they
necessarily informed of the criteria governing the judgments. 46 2) A b-
sence of a hearing. Applicants were accorded no opportunity to present
facts in their favor. Nor would the opportunity to be heard have been
useful without notice of the criteria followed by the committees.47
3) Variability of forum for decisionmaking. Because there were several
preliminary stages in the selection processes, some applicants were ex-
cluded from committee consideration, whereas others were not. In
the absence of procedural safeguards, the preliminary "exclusions" 48
by the medical directors may have had the effect of dooming patients
which the committees would have saved, even if the decisions by the
directors and the committees were ostensibly made according to the
same standards. 4) Lack of guarantee of a fair tribunal. There was
no check on the composition of committees to ensure against bias.
43. See Note, supra note 37, at 654.
44. Id. at 639-54.
45. See SYLLABUS, supra note 42, at 3-5, 8, 9; Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 2,
at 366-80; Note, supra note 37, at 647, 655.
46. SYLLABUS, supra note 42, at 4-5; David, supra note 2, at 584.
47. Of course this does not mean that an aggressive patient or one with a well-con-
nected physician could not arrange to ensure that all pertinent facts be favorably pre-
sented. In general, however, it is likely that important facts in many patients' favor
will not come out and possible that facts will be distorted in a negative way by the
depressing influence of sickness and hospitalization on the behavior and attitudes of
some patients.
48. "Exclusion" is the term used in Note, supra note 37, at 654-57, to describe the
initial decision to keep a patient out of the pool from which recipients of treatment
will ultimately be selected.
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5) Lack of notification of the decision and its grounds. Those who
were rejected were not necessarily told the fact and why. This effec-
tively prevented them from seeking some kind of review or oppor-
tunities for treatment elsewhere. Taken together, these inadequacies
created a possibility that decisions by hospitals would be arbitrary
or discriminatory.
III. What Process is Due?
A. Evaluating Costs and Benefits
As Justice Frankfurter Wrote, due process "is not a technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances . . . [but] a delicate process of adjustment . . The pro-
tections which are due should reflect both the magnitude and the
nature of the interest at stake (access to scarce lifesaving resources) as
well as the "costs" ° of interfering with other priorities.51 The Su-
preme Court follows the general rule that
consideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the governmental function involved as well
as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action. 52
Recent decisions of the Court in analagous situations provide some
insight into what factors will bear on the allocation of scarce medical
resources. They set out what the Court considers the minimum process
due in cases where individual interests of lesser magnitude than life
are at stake.53 Recent cases also identify various costs, including ex-
49. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 241 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
50. The term "costs" refers to disadvantages both of a pecuniary and nonpecuniary
nature.
51. It should be stressed that procedural safeguards are the only concern here; the
content of underlying substantive standards is beyond the scope of this analysis.
52. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (emphasis added), quoting Cafeteria
8& Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
53. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (elaborate procedures justified
on the ground that the benefits involved (welfare payments) were interests bearing on
the "very means by which to live"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison
disciplinary action); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation). The following procedural
requirements can be culled from the above cases:
1) An opportunity for a hearing tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those
who are to be heard, Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 268-69, and in conjunction with
the hearing:
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penseG4 and interference with the institution's pursuit of broader so-
cial goals.1; The Court measures these costs according to the circum-
stances of the particular case, 56 and suggests that if circumstances
change over time, the requirements of due process may change as well.
57
Since the "precise nature of the governmental [and institutional and
social] function" must be considered, it will be impossible to fashion
appropriate safeguards without going beyond existing cases, each one
of which turns on its own factual context. A special problem in de-
signing procedural safeguards for the allocation of lifesaving resources
stems from the very scarcity of those resources, and calls for stream-
lined procedures. The expense of implementing due process may ac-
tually diminish access to the lifesaving treatment by using up funds
that could be increasing the supply of treatment. 8 Therefore, the need
a) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed denial of
benefits, id. at 267-68;
b) sufficient information as to the criteria on which decisionmaking will be based,
id. at 269;
c) an effective opportunity to defend by presenting affirmative evidence, and con-
fronting and cross-examining witnesses, id., unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation and cross-examination, Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, supra at 786; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra at 489.
2) An impartial decisionmaker who has not participated in making the initial find-
ings under review. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 271.
3) A requirement of counsel where the facts which would be controlling at the hear-
ing are difficult to develop and where in the administrator's opinion it appears that
the individual is not capable of speaking effectively for himself. Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
supra at 790-91.
4) A record or digest of the hearing and its result, and a written statement indi-
cating the reasons for the decision and the evidence relied on. Id. at 786; Morrissey
v. Brewer, supra at 487; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 271.
Since the interest of a patient in remaining alive is greater than the interests in-
volved in the above cases, the procedures there found mandatory ought to be im-
plemented in the medical context in some form, unless the special offsetting costs are
significantly greater or the usefulness of the safeguard is significantly less.
Of the procedures listed above, the hearing is "the fundamental requisite of due
process." Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 267, citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914). Unlike the hearing, the other safeguards require a more specific showing of use-
fulness. See Wolff v. McDonnell, supra at 566-67; Gaguon v. Scarpelli, supra at 786-88.
If a court is unable to determine whether the incremental benefit of a specific procedure
outweighs the costs, it may entrust its use, within suggested guidelines, to the discretion
of the administrator. See Wolff v. McDonnell, supra at 569-72; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra
at 790.
54. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (asserting that a claim of expense
"does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process").
55. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 483 (1972) (safeguards can and should be devised in such a way that a proper
domain for discretion is reserved).
56. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-63 (1974), the Court considered the
possibilities that an adversary hearing in prison disciplinary proceedings would heighten
antagonisms, perhaps induce retaliation, and thus interfere with prison goals of dis-
cipline and rehabilitation as well as safety of personnel. The weight of those costs led
the Court to restrict procedural due process requirements.
57. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 (1974).
58. If allocation without substantive standards (i.e., with mechanical standards, see
note 42 supra) turned out to be so much cheaper than allocation with those standards
that substantial additional resources could be financed by the difference in cost, it could
even be argued that allocation procedures which employ substantive standards are a
violation of due process.
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for minimal procedures derives not merely from the normal con-
siderations against burdening the state, but also from the nature of
the protected interest itself.
Attendant to the allocation of scarce lifesaving resources are a num-
ber of other problems which affect the application of the established
principles of due process: (1) patient anxiety; (2) infringement of pri-
vacy; (3) waste of resources (overly elaborate process could slow down
allocation to such an extent that some patients die unnecessarily); and
(4) social anxiety (public awareness of decisions about life and death
may be unsettling, especially if the standards for decision vary from
place to place).
B. Recommendations
The following discussion of safeguards is not intended as a detailed
program, but rather as a basic framework for allocating lifesaving
medical resources. This general outline reflects the prior cases, the spe-
cial costs and benefits, and the need to remedy obvious defects in
established practices.59
1. Hearing and Notice
To guard against inconsistent decisionmaking, a unified hearing
should replace the various multistep processes. Establishing the basic
requirement of a hearing still leaves open the proper format of the
hearing. First, to lessen the anxiety to waiting applicants, the standard
procedures should not be unduly protracted. There should be limita-
tions on the time between application and notice, between notice and
hearing, and between hearing and decision. To further reduce anxiety,
the applicant's opportunity to confront witnesses should remain with-
in the discretion of the decisionmakers at the hearing.00 The presence
of the patient at the hearing need not always be required since a
representative could take his or her place. The privacy of the patients
can be safeguarded to some extent by not permitting outsiders to at-
59. For concrete recommendations, further empirical data is needed. A full and mean-
ingful account of the costs and benefits in this area requires extensive study of the
economics of resource development and distribution, of hospital administration, of gov-
ernment health administration, and of possible alternative methods for adapting quasi-
adjudicative processes to a hospital setting or affording access to adjudicative forums
outside the hospital. Moreover, a meaningful cost-benefit analysis would require sub-
stantial information about the physical, financial and emotional hardships created by
the diseases in question. Recommendations of a specific nature should also be shaped
by arguments of interested parties. If they have the opportunity to press their own
arguments, the common law process will have a chance to make its contribution.
60. This discretion has been allowed in post-conviction prison proceedings for an-
alogous reasons. See note 53 supra.
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tend. It might be desirable to allow the decisionmakers to exercise
some discretion as to substantive criteria, since they may encounter
situations to which the announced criteria do not effectively apply.
In that case, the notice given to the applicants would have to reflect
this possibility; any decision not arising under established criteria
should be explained in a written opinion. 61
The scarce resources should never be allowed to lie fallow because
of delays in the selection process. Hospital administrators should have
the responsibility of coordinating allocation' procedures, and the pre-
rogative of intervening in them to ensure that no one suffers as a
result of protracted formalities. 62
2. Impartial Decisionmaker
It is a general principle of due process that there be no undue prior
involvement of the decisionmaker with the case being decided.63 Such
prior involvement would be particularly distorting in the allocation
of scarce lifesaving resources, where the number who can receive bene-
fits is unrelated to the number who deserve them. 64
Since those who are denied treatment will die, allowing decisions
by individuals who have prior involvement with the applicants creates
the possibility of guilt, pressure, and favoritism. It may also be well
not to assign doctors to the committees which decide on the alloca-
tion of treatment. Their medical expertise does not in itself bear on
the kinds of decisions that committees are called on to make,6 5 and
might better be devoted to healing other patients.
3. Representative
Representation serves to mediate between individuals and the insti-
tutions making decisions about their rights. Individuals are unlikely
61. This discretion would not allow committees to defy established standards, but
only to apply additional standards to unanticipated problems. Admittedly, to allow any
discretion at all might invite abuse, and perhaps no ad hoc "solutions" should be allowed.
62. The danger of giving administrators such authority is that they might exercise it
too liberally. But the possibility that intervention and demand for rapid decisions might
cause mistakes in a limited number of cases should probably be tolerated, since the
alternative of wasting already scarce resources seems worse.
63. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). Obviously, it would also
be unacceptable to allow the systematic exclusion of racial or ethnic minorities. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
64. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970), where the Court indicated
that functionaries in the welfare system who had had certain dealings with the recipient
were not necessarily barred from participating in the decision on eligibility. But in that
context there is less likelihood of prejudicial effect from emotional involvement and
bias. Unlike medical decisionmakers, welfare personnel need not deny benefits to anyone
they find needy.
65. See Veatch, Generalization of Expertise, 1 HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES 29 (1973).
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to be familiar with decisionmaking processes; decisionmakers rely on
information about such individuals which, if improperly presented or
obtained, may foster distortions or inaccuracies.
Patients' representatives need not have had legal training; a social
work background might be appropriate. There is an additional ques-
tion whether such representatives could be members of the hospital
staff or whether they should function independently of any hospital.0
In any case, a single representative should not work on behalf of two
competing applicants.
An additional area of concern is the nature of the representation
appropriate for allocation hearings. The fact that such situations can
be emotionally charged might argue against allowing the patient to
be present at the hearing, and in any case he or she should have
the option of being represented in absentia. Similarly, the representa-
tive could shelter the patient from the occasional harshness of com-
mittee procedures." The style of deliberation at the hearing could
be adversary (with the representative acting as an advocate, able to
withhold facts unfavorable to his client) s or collegial (with the rep-
resentative participating in the decision on the basis of full dis-
closure).69 In either case, the overriding function of the representative
would be to discover and present relevant facts and to make up for
deficiencies in the ability of individual applicants to represent them-
selves.
4. Record and Opinion
Due process generally requires decisionmakers to produce a record
of their proceedings and an opinion stating the facts and reasons re-
lied upon.7 0 The purpose is to enable individuals to ascertain that
66. If'the caseworker is a member of the hospital staff, there would be the risk of
insufficient detachment from institutional pressures and priorities. However, if represen-
tatives were outsiders to the hospital, their unfamiliarity with hospital procedures might
impair their performance.
67. The representative will be familiar with the patient's background, and there-
fore in a position to explain the relevant procedures to the patient, without burdening
the patient unnecessarily with details which might cause anxiety in the particular case.
68. To ensure their capacity to protect privacy, measures could be taken to bring
representatives within one of the established evidentiary privileges. See generally Mc-
CORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 72-77, 87-97, 98-105, 313 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972) (concerning privileges generally, the lawyer-client privilege, the physician-
patient privilege, and the use of hospital records).
69. Requiring full disclosure of facts seems preferable. There is, to be sure, no such
obligation on defense lawyers in the criminal system. But in medical allocation only a
limited number of people can "win" their cases; therefore the withholding of informa-
tion hurts competing applicants. The requirement of disclosure does not necessarily imply
a collegial hearing. The representative can still influence the interpretation of the stan-
dards to be employed in the face of unfavorable facts.
70. See cases cited in note 53 supra.
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their rights have been properly protected, and to provide a possible
basis for recourse. 71 In this particular area the advantages of providing
a record, an opinion and a right of recourse must be judged against
the disadvantages of inefficiency, patient anxiety, invasion of privacy,
and-if such material were made available to the public-the unsettling
of established perceptions about the value of human life.
A requirement of record and opinion imposes only a slight burden
on the hospital; someone can take notes and write a summary of the
decisionmaking process.72 To prevent infringement of privacy, all iden-
tifying features of records and opinions can be removed. Another pos-
sibility is simply to destroy them after some period of time. But there
would be significant advantages in retaining them as a source of in-
formation for future decisionmakers and representatives. 73 They would
promote uniformity in decisionmaking and public confidence in the
basic fairness of the process.
One danger of releasing records and opinions for study is that of
exposing a body of decisions in an area which people find unsettling.
Given that many of our received values deny the possibility of ranking
the worth of individual human lives, it would conceivably be safer to
conceal the process of decision from the public. But increased public
awareness promises its own rewards. It permits individuals to bring
a wide range of criticisms and suggestions to bear on the process. The
understanding gained from widespread debate may well bring about
increased or more efficient spending on medical resources.74
71. In the context of the allocation of scarce medical resources, there are several
conceivable forms of recourse: (1) applying for resources at other institutions where one
might expect to fare better under the evaluative system; (2) complaining to hospital
allocation supervisors if one feels that there has been a mistake or other abuse; (3)
making a similar complaint to state health officials; and (4) seeking judicial relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) for possible violations of due process, equal protection or other
constitutional rights.
72. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 487 (1972).
73. See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 400-03.
74. More efficient spending does not necessarily imply increased spending on scarce
resources. Certain preventive measures, for example, may ultimately save more lives.
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